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s economic necessity forces Vietnam to 
adopt some elements of a market economy, to maintain an "open-
door" policy towards the west and to withdraw its forces from neigh-
boring Laos and Cambodia, an elaborate effort also appears to be 
underway to portray its client regimes in Vientiane and Phnom Penh 
as independent of Hanoi. Lao Deputy Foreign Minister Souban Salit-
thilat declared before a foreign reporter last February that the idea of 
a federation of Indochina was "gone forever" and suggested that Viet-
nam must "adjust" to growing nationalism in Vientiane and Phnom 
Penh. The Laotians tliemselves have been expanding their economic 
and other relations with Thailand in an effort to nurse their ailing 
economy back to health. But those who would deduce from the 
public burials of the concept of an Indochinese federation, from the 
reduction in the Vietnamese troop presence in Laos and from Laos' 
expanding relations with neighboring Thailand that the era of Lao 
dependence on Vietnam is over tend to ignore the underlying reality 
— that the Laotian regime is deeply indebted to Hanoi. Ever since 
the Pathet Lao was created ex nihilo by the Vietminh in 1945, the Viet-
namese have always been almost entirely responsible for the training 
of the Laotian army. And although the bulk of Vietnam's troops v^ll 
have eventually been vdthdrawn from Laos, Vietnamese "advisers" 
v^ll almost certainly continue to be attached to all levels of the com-
mand structure of the Lao army. In this issue of Indochina Report, 
KENNETH j CONBOY, an Indochina specialist, reopens a chapter 
in the history of military cooperation between Laos and Vietnam to 
expose the Pathet Lao's dep>endence on the Vietminh for the creation 
of tlie.Lao People's Democratic Republic. As tlie Laotian Communist 
Party rewrites its history in a forthcoming official publication to sug-
gest that the Pathet Lao magnanimously delayed their takeover of the 
country by two years so that Hanoi could continue to use the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail, Mr Conboy delves into li tile known details of Laotian his-
tory to prove that the ineffectual Pathet Lao could not have achieved 
victory themselves even if circumstances had been different. • 
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bloodless compared to 
the battles elsavhere in 
Indochina 
INTRODUCTION 
D uring the course of Uie Second Indocliina War, world allention remained focused on the battles fought in and over North and South Vietnam. In contrast, tl\e media rarely covered the fighting in neighboring Laos. This v^ as for several 
reasons. First, the widespread US involvement in South Vietnam kept most news 
reporters in that country. Second, tine fighting in Laos did not get heavy until 1968, 
well after fighting in Vietnam had already captivated people's attentions. Third, the 
"secret" na ture of foreign involvement in the Laotian war inhibited the access of foreign 
journalists to the battlefield. 
The resultant lack of accurate media reporting in Laos led to serious misperceptions 
being offered both during and after the war. In May 1975, for example, as Pathet Lao 
revolutionaries marched victoriously through the sleepy Mekong towns of Vientiane, 
Savannakhet and Thakhek, the western media was quick to point out that, unlike the 
brutal final offensives of the North Vietnamese against Saigon and the Kl\mer Rouge 
against Phnom Penli, the Pathet Lao had used near-bloodless political maneuvering 
and intimidation to overwhelm and slowly defeat their pro-western coalition partners 
in a two-year old tripartite government in Vientiane. 
The notion that the war in Laos was a relatively bloodless affair, however, was far 
from true. Laos did, in fact, suffer tremendous losses during years of heavy fighting, 
rivaling many of the most publicized battles elsewhere in Indocliina. 
Significantly, while the communist forces in Laos suffered thousands of casualties in 
the battlefield, the Pathet Lao can only be credited with a minor supporting role during 
the key years of combat. By 1968, in fact, Pathet Lao military participation was little 
more than a footnote to tlie larger campaign being waged against Vientiane by the 
People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). This stands in stark contrast to the "official" Pathet 
Lao statements made during and since the war, which spotlight their own involve-
ment in fighting while dowmplaying the role of Vietnamese "volunteer" elements. 
The long history of communist Vietnamese involvement in neighboring Laos started 
as World War Two was coming to an end. Eager to forestall a return of colonial rule 
to Indochina, Ho Chi Mirth's Vietminh movement began assisting anti-French Laotians 
attempting to take over the capital of Vientiane in October 1945.^  
\letminh assistance to the fledgling anti-French movement in Laos increased during 
the late 1940s to include material assistance as well as guerrilla training. By the early 
1950s, the Vietminh had detailed four battalions to work closely with leftist Lao 
revolutionaries, by then called the Pathet Lao, at jungle camps concentrated in Sam 
Neua province near the Vietnamese border.^ 
In late 1952, with Pathet Lao forces stiU only capable of limited harassing operations, 
the Vietminh decided to launch their own offensive against the light French defenses 
covering northern Laos. After months of quiet planning, the Vietminh poured across 
the border in April of the following year. The Vietminh's 316 Division, composed 
primarily of T'ai hill tribesmen, overwhelmed the government garrison of Sam Neua 
and pursued tlie fleeing defenders towards French defensive lines along tlie strategic 
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Plain of Jars. At the same time, the Vietminh 148 Independent Regiment, another 
hilltribe formation, departed its base area near Dien Bien Phu with the mission of cap-
turing the city of Luang Prabang, the seat of the Laotian monarchy. A third Vietminh 
division, meanwhile, began moving west towards the Plain of Jars, with plans to link 
up v^th the 316 Division. 
The Vietminh invasion succeeded in slicing deep into northern Laos and forcing 
himdreds of French reinforcements to be rushed to the battlefield. The 316 Division 
managed to push up to the edge of the Plain of Jars, completely demolishing the rem-
nants of the three government battalions that had been defending Sam Neua. On the 
Luang Prabang front, the 148 Regiment advanced to wdthin a few kilometers of the 
city before French forces stabilized the defensive line. 
After three weeks of fighting, the Vietminh slowly began to wathdraw, apparently 
convinced that it would be unwise to allow ti^e approaching monsoon season to leave 
them bogged down in Laos and vulnerable to the more maneuverable French forces. 
However, while they had failed to capture either Luang Prabang or the Plain of Jars, 
the invasion of Laos was a tremendous boost to the morale of the Vietminh, proving 
to themselves that they were entirely capable of coordinating a multi-divisional attack 
in foreign territory. 
Following the Lao invasion, the Vietminh shifted their attention to the isolated French 
garrison at Dien Bien Phu, ultimately defeating the French forces in May 1954 after a 
prolonged, bloody siege. The Vietminh, however, had not completely withdrav^ 
from Laos. As late as the Indochina ceasefire in August 1954, for example, French/Lao 
forces were battling Vietminh guerrillas near the Mu Gia Pass in the upper Laotian 
panhandle. 
In April 1953 the 
Vietminh launched a 
tnulti-divisionaJ attack 
against the French 
forces in Laos 
I I 
Two months after the August ceasefire, the Vietminh, now called the PAVN, had 
helped move the Pathet Lao's "Officer Candidate School" from Phu Quy in Nghe An 
province into the jungles of Sam Neua province. Twenty PAVN advisors remained at-
tached to the school. An additional 300 Vietnamese military and political instructors 
belonged to Doan (Group) 100, a PAVN advisory unit that oversaw assistance to the 
Pathet Lao. 
Although the PAVN is believed to have officially disbanded Doan 100 by 1957 — in 
anticipation of Pathet Lao integration into a coalition government — Pathet Lao defec-
tors and prisoners later confirmed that limited Vietnamese training continued 
throughout the second half of the 1950s. 
By 1959, after friction between the pro-western Royal Laotian Government in Vien-
tiane and the Sam Neua-based Pathet Lao had frustrated hopes for the formation of a 
coalition, the Pathet Lao's sole battalion fled across the border into North Vietnam and 
began a short period of retraining and refitting. By nnid-year, the Pathet Lao, aug-
mented by limited PAVN artillery and ground support, pushed into Sam Neua 
province and captured several government-controlled border villages. The govern-
ment was later able to retake the lost territory with only minor casualties.^ 
During the same year, PAVN created two groups responsible for operations in Laos. 
At the end of May, the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee in Hanoi 
issued a resolution officially creating Doan 559 to organize a travel route tlirough Laos 
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into Sou til Vietnam and oversee the sending of people, supplies and weapx?ns to tlie 
southern front. In later years, this supply path would be Imown as the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail. Dofin 559 also would be responsible for all logistical and defense units spanning 
tlie trail. 
During September, the Central Committee in Hanoi and the Central Committee of 
tlie Pathet Lao agreed to organize Doan 959, a delegation of Vietnamese military 
sf>ecialists assigned to "work side-by-side with the Military Commission of the 
Supreme Command of the Laotian People's Liberation Army [Pathet Lao]". The Ooan 
959 rear headquarters was at Gia Lam, four kilometers from Hanoi; the group's for-
ward headquarters was co-located with the Pathet Lao command in Sam Neua. 
In August 1960, the government's 2 Para Battalion rebelled and took over Vientiane. 
Captain Kong Le, leader of the mutinous paratroopers, became a self-proclaimed 
Neutralist and promptly invited both the Royalists and the Pathet Lao to form a coali-
tion government. The Royalists, who vasdy outnumbered Kong Le's Neutralists, 
refused to cooperate and began planning a counter-revolution from their stronghold 
in Savannakhet. The Pathet Lao, however, exploited tlie opportunity and quickly sent 
volunteers from Sam Neua to augment Kong Le's paratroopers in Vientiane. 
Soon after the Pathet Lao entered Vientiane, PAVN offered its supp>ort. By Novem-
ber, five PAVN 105mm howitzers and gim crew had been flown into the capital and 
were awaiting the Royalist counter-attack. When the Royalists pushed back into Vien-
tiane the following month, the artillery crews vdthdrew with Kong Le towards the 
Plain of Jars. 
During the opening months of 1961, the Royal Laotian Government obtained its first 
concrete proof of PAVN intervention in Laos: prisoners-of-war. Prisoners who were 
interrogated said that PAVN cadres were sent through the border town of Nong Het 
to bolster recently-formed Pathet Lao battalions on the Plain of Jars and along High-
way 13 linking Vientiane and Luang Prabang. For example, a Vietnamese prisoner 
tciken on Januauy 31 at Vang Vieng, 70 km north of Vientiane, was a member of the 
PAVN 335 CHIvision seconded to the Pathet Lao 17 Battalion. By the year's end, addi-
tional Metnaonese military specialists were posted at Phongsavanh in the middle of 
the Plain of Jars. 
Sporadic fighting between Royalists and Pathet Lao/Neutralists continued through 
early 1962, generally dividing the country into two equal areas of military control. 
During February, heavy fighting erupted-around the northwestern garrison of Nam 
Tha. Radio communications intercepted in the vicinity of Nam Tha indicated that the 
enemy was not Pathet Lao, but rather PAVN forces vdth Chinese logistical support. 
By May, Nam Tha had been captured by the PAVN, sending the government gcurison 
fleeing south across the Mekong and into Thailand. 
Although a ceasefire went into effect in 1962 and a tripartite coalition government 
was formed, low-intensity fighting persisted in the countryside. Over the next three 
years, the PAVN continued to provide advisors for Pathet Lao forces in the Plain of 
Jars and Pathet Lao headquarters located in the caves near Sam Neua City. 
ILL 
In early 1966, the North Vietnamese government made the decision to significantly 
expcmd its military involvement in Laos. Unlike previous years, when the PAVN sup-
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ported Palhet Lao insurgents in the field, Vietnamese forces were now to dominate 
certain specific military operations. 
This new strategy of escalated involvement first became apparent when elements of 
the 168 Regiment of the PAVN 316 Division departed Phu Yen, North Vietnam, on 
February 15, and overwhelmed the important government outpost at Na Khang two 
days later. The 168 Regiment then captured nearby bases at Muong Hiam and Muong 
Son. Ouring the attacks, the only Pathet Lao unit in the vicinity, the 705 Battalion, 
played only a minor supix)rting role. 
By mid-1966, with the onset of the rainy season, the PAVN forces v^thdrew towards 
commimist-controUed territory around Sam Neua City and allowed government for-
ces to reclaim all of the garrisons lost during the opening months of the year. This be-
came a familiar pattern: select PAVN forces spearheaded the communist drive during 
the dry season and allowed Vietnamese/Pathet Lao forces to occupy terrain until the 
onset of the rains, then withdrew to Sam Neua during the rainy season. 
To provide a permanent core of PAVN combat units to serve in northeast Laos, Hanoi 
formed the four-battalion Doan 766 in July 1966 under the administrative control of 
the PAVN Northwest Military Region. Doan 766 battalions guarded major Pathet Lao 
bases in Sam Neua, provided instructors for Pathet Lao units and were used in com-
bat operations. At the same time, PAVN created another four-battalion group, Doan 
565, in southern Laos to handle operations in the panhandle. 
In late 1967, Hanoi once again decided to escalate its involvement in Laos, this time 
by completely casting aside the ineffectual Pathet Lao figleaf and committing unprece-
dented numbers of PAVN regulars to the battlefront. This decision coincided vdth 
plans for the Tet Offensive in January 1968. 
Hanoi decided to 
escalate its 
involvement in Laos in 
late 1967, committing 
unprecedented 
numbers of PAVN 
regulars to the 
battlefront 
1968 ... 
The first evidence of the new PAVN focus on northeastern Laos came in the first week 
of January 1968 when the PAVN 335 Independent Regiment,-* elements of the 316 
Division and the Pathet Lao 409 Battalion overran the fnajor government garrison at 
Nam Bac, north of Luang Prabang, after a prolonged siege. PAVN prisoners captured 
before Nam Bac fell claimed that Hanoi's goals were to cjivert attention away from the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos and to demolish the government's best parachute 
battalions which had been sent to bolster the garrison. 
The dust at Nam Bac had not yet settled before PAVN launched its next major drive 
in Laos, this time against a key government garrison p>erched atop Phou Pha Thi moun-
tain in Sam Neua province. Phou Pha Thi's garrison, also known as LS 85, held a vital 
US Air Force TACAN (tactical air navigation) site used to guide aircraft to and from 
bombing missions in Laos and North Vietnam. Although the site was close to the Viet-
namese border, Phou Pha Thi's huge cliffs offered the garrison an "impregnable" 
defense. 
The PAVN assault on Phou Pha Thi followed an intensive reconnaissance mission by 
a handpicked commando company from the PAVN 305 Dac Cong Command. The 
Dac Cong, often misleadingly translated as "sappers" in the west, were highly trained 
special operations teams.^ 
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Following recommendations from the Dac Cong company, Hanoi in November dis-
patched three North Vietnamese AN-2 biplanes to straff and bomb the TACAN site.*^  
This was the first tiume the North Vietnamese Air Force was used on an offensive mis-
sion outside its borders. 
By the first two months of 1968, three battalions from E>oan 766 had infiltrated into 
the jungles around Phou Pha Thi, and slowly began to overrun surrounding outposts. 
Then, on March 9, PAVN performed one of the most spectacular operations in the en-
tire Second Indochina War. While elements of Doan 766 were infiltrating around tliree 
sides of the mountain, a team of Dac Cong commandos scaled Phou Pha Thi's 5,600-
foot cliffs at night and overwhelmed the TACAN site. Thirteen Americans at the site 
were killed, some of their bodies allegedly thrown from the cliff7 
With the summit of the mountain secured by the commamdos, the 923, 927 and 623 
Battalions of Doan 766 overran the remaining government defenders ciroimd the base 
of the site. By March 11, the North Vietnamese were in control of Phou Pha Thi. 
After capturing LS 85, a total of «ight PAVN battalions pressed southwest towards 
the Plain of Jars, sweeping aside all government outposts in their path. 
Further south, Doan 565 became more active in the panhandle. Controlled by the 
PAVN 4th Military Region, the group consisted of the 927 Battalion operating near 
Saravane, the 2 Battalion around Lao Ngam, the 3 Battalion around Attapeu, and the 
4 Battalion north of Saravane. Otlier PAVN units were used in Laos for short-dura-
tion missions. For example, the 4 Company, 3 Battalion, PAVN 47 Regiment, attacked 
the southern tovm of Thateng in July 1968. 
As PAVN assumed full control on the front line, the Pathet Lao increasingly sank back 
to the rear echelon. In northeastern Laos — the scene of the heaviest fighting in the 
country — the Pathet Lao did little more than provide security and logistic units in 
and around the Pathet Lao headquarters at Sam Neua. Despite propaganda claims to 
the contrary, tliose Pathet Lao formations that ventured towards the Plain of Jsirs usual-
ly operated in bands of only platoon strength, and rarely engaged the govenunent for-
ces. This was true cdso of &)e Pathet Lao presence in the rest of the country. 
One of the greatest factors hindering the Pathet Lao was manpower shortages. Not 
only was the Laotian population small'to begin vdth, but the Pathet Lao had been 
forced to recruit from the most sparsely populated regions of the country. So thin were 
the Pathet Lao ranks that by 1968 prisoners were being pressed into service. The 235 
Transportation Battalion in Sam Neua, for example, was composed of 500 prisoners 
captured at Nam Bac. 
In late 1968, the government parted from the standard flow of the war and decided 
to laimch a major operation to recapture Phou Pha Thi. The operation, codenamed 
PIGFAT, began v^th a massive outpJouring of US airpower to soften up the elements 
of Doan 766 dug into the side of the mountain. Government forces then stormed the 
sides of the mountain and were able to get a toehold at the base by early December. 
Despite early advances, PIGFAT soon bogged dovm. The three Doan 766 battalions, 
ordered not to surrender, refused to relinquish any ground. In the process, half of the 
927 Battalion was wiped out. At the end, only 480 Vietnamese out of the original 1,500 
defenders survived the onslaught of groimd assaults and airstrikes. 
By late December, PAVN had dispatched two fresh regiments to Phou Pha Thi, in-
cluding the entire 148 Regiment of the 316 Division.® PAVN continued to take heavy 
casualties, including an estimated 128 dead from the 148 Regiment, but was able to 
maintain its grip on the strategic mountain. In doing so, Hanoi had demonstrated its 
will to absorb tremendous losses in the Laotian battl^ield. Hanoi had also shown tliat 
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PAVN formations would be dominating the Lao battlefield from then onwards; the Hanoi sJiowed great 
Pathet Lao would be conspicuous by their absence. resilience in spite of 
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1969 ... 
In early 1969, PAVN launched its most ambitious dry season offensive into north-
eastern Laos. With Doan 766 too small to handle PAVN's growing needs in north-
eastern Laos, Hanoi ordered the 148 Regiment from Sam Neua to attack the 
government outpost at Na Khang. In previous years, PAVN had approached the gar-
rison from along the treeline; US airpower always anticipated this line of attack and 
had handed the Vietnamese excessive casualties. This time, the 148 Regiment aj> 
proached through an exposed expanse of elephant grass, a completely unanticipated 
direction that caught the garrison by surprise and allowed P A \ ^ to overwhelm the 
post before aircraft could begin to react. 
After capturing Na Khang, PAVN moved the 316 Division onto the Plain of Jars. The 
316 Division was a light division, composed of three 1,500-man regiments — the 148, 
174 and 176 — plus some anti-aircraft and other support units. Following normal 
PAVN deployment doctrine, two thirds of the division was committed to the bat-
tlefield, with one third held in reserve. For the remainder of the war, this usually trans-
lated into the 148 and 174 Regiments committed to Laos, with the 176 Regiment held 
across the border in the Northwest Military Region. 
By May 1969, the 316 Division, along with token Pathet Lao forces around Xieng 
Khouangville and Phongsavanh, were in control of the area surrounding the Plain of 
Jars. In contrast to previous years, however, Hanoi had decided to keep the division 
on the plain during the rainy season. The reason for this departure from tradition was 
that a new route was being constructed directly west from Vinh through Nong Het to 
the plain, which would simplify resupply missions and allow PAVN forces to be sup-
ported even during the rains. 
Once the rains began in July, however, PAVN's plans began falling apart. A concerted 
US Air Force bombing campaign turned existing supply trails from Sam Neua into rib-
bons of impassable mud. The new route from the-North Vietnamese border, 
meanwhile, was not finished in time to carry sufficient supplies to the 316 Division on 
the plain. As a result, government forces were able to inflict an embarrassing rout of 
PAVN, sending the half-starved 316 Division fleeing back towards North Vietnam. 
Amazingly, despite the identification of hundreds of Vietncimese bodies and the cap-
ture of several dozen PAVN prisoners by Laotian government forces, Hanoi still 
adamantly denied the presence of any N o r ^ Vietnamese armed units fighting in Laos. 
Hanoi did not spend long lamenting its losses on the Plain of Jars. Even as the last 
remnants of the 316 Division were crossing the border into North Vietnam, replace-
ments were already flowing back in the other direction. By September, the 141 Regi-
ment of the 312 Division was moving west along Route 7 towards the town of Ban Ban, 
immediately east of the Plain of Jars. 
During mid-December, the PAVN began to exert pressure against the government 
forces garrisoned in the middle of the plain. On December 17, two Dac Cong com-
panies, including one that had participated in tlie attack on LS 85 the previous year, 
hit L 22, a key government base and airstrip near the town of Phongsavanh. The 
government successfully defended the base. 
Apr-Jun 1989 Indochina Report 7 
In 1970, Hanoi lost its 
logistical conduit 
through Cambodia 
awing to the fall of the 
Sihanouk government 
1970 ... 
On January 12 of the following year, PAVN resumed Its push on the Plain of Jars. 
Charging the garrison at Phou Nok Kok on the northeastern rim of the plain, Dac Cong 
commandos, armed with mortars and flamethrowers, overran the government forces. 
Once Phou Nok Kok was under their control, PAVN brought forward the 148 Regi-
ment of the 316 Division, which had returned briefly to North Vietnam for refitting. 
Together wiih the 141 Regiment, both units were ordered to recaptxire the Plain of Jars, 
as well as the regioncd headquarters of government forces at Long Heng, located sou tlv 
west of the plain. 
During the first week of February, several hundred Dac Cong commandos, aug-
mented by a handful of PT-76 amphibious tanks, surged out from Phou Nok Kok 
across the plain. Government troops at L 22 held back two tank assaults, but, after a 
Vietnamese rocket ignited the garrison's ammunition dump, the base defenders 
crumbled during a third attack. 
By April, PAVN was in complete control of the plain, though its concerted attacks 
against Long Tieng had been frustrated by timely government reinforcements from 
other military regions. Dvuing the entire operation, not a single major Pathet Lao for-
mation had been involved. 
Elsewhere in Laos, PAVN units were similarly engaged against the Vientiane govern-
ment The 335 Independent Regiment, which had participated in the 1968 capture of 
Nam Bac, was still operating north of Luang Prabang. 
Meanwhile, PAVN operations in southern Laos had taken on new significance after 
the change in governments in Cambodia had suddenly deprived North Vietnam of its 
important logistical conduit through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. As a result 
of the loss of Hanoi's Cambodian conduit, the Ho Chi Minh Trail became the only 
mear\s of resupplying communist forces fighting in South Vietnam. 
To protect the Ho Chi Minh trail, PAVN immediately began to expand its area of in-
fluence, slowly pushing the Laotian government forces towards the Mekong. To coor-
dinate its campaign in the southernmost region of Laos, PAVN disbanded Doan 565 
and replaced it with the larger Front X, consisting of the 9 Independent Regiment and 
supporting imits seconded from Doan 559. 
EHiring the onset of the rainy season in mid-1970, PAVN pulled back most of its for-
ces from the Plain of Jars, consciously avoiding the mistakes it had made the previous 
year. The government forces, however, were so weakened that they were unable to 
significcintly expand their area of influence. 
By November, PAVN was gearing up for its next offensive on tlie Plain of Jars. Be-
cause Route 72, the new route which connected Vinh with Ban Ban and bypassed the 
old interdicted Route 7, had finally been completed, PAVN was able to vastly improve 
its resupply effort into northeastern Laos. 
The new supply route also allowed PAVN to shift the logistical command for its Plain 
of Jcirs operation from the Nortliwest Military Region based in Son La to tlie Fourth 
Military Region based in Vinh. PAVN operations in southern Laos also came under 
the commamd of the Fourth Military Region, putting all major PAVN campaigns imder 
one administrative command. 
Indochina Report 8 Apr-Jun 1989 
1971... 
During December, PAVN was easily able to reoccupy the Plain of Jars with elements 
of the 312 and 316 Divisions. By March 1971, PAVN had deployed the greatest num-
ber of troops to date around the plain, with the 148 and 174 Regiments of the 316 
Division around the key government base of Long Tieng; the 165 and 209 Regiments 
of the 312 Division along the western rim of the plain; the 866 Independent Regiment 
also west of the plain; and the 766 Independent Regiment' along the northeastern 
comer of the plainJ® Again, Hanoi had ordered the capture of Long Tieng, but again 
the government defenders were able to hold back the ^etnamese. 
During April, in anticipation of the upcoming rainy season, PAVN withdrew the bulk 
of its forces northeast of the Plain of Jars; only the 148 Regiment of the 316 Division 
remained in the viciiuty of Long Tieng. 
In the south, PAVN had renamed Front X — their campaign to expand the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail — to Front Y. Under Front Y, the 9 Independent Regiment laimched a 
surprise attack in the middle of the year against the key government garrison at Pak-
song, in the center of the Bolovens Plateau. The regiment occupied Paksong until a 
government helibome coimter-attack retook the city in September. 
PAVN efforts to expand the Ho Chi Minh Trail were vital to their war effort in South 
Vietnam, especially after the March 1970 loss of its Sihanouk Trail logistics route. 
Doan 559, which oversaw the Ho Chi Minh Trail network, was divided into Binh Trams 
(BT), or regional stations that controlled logistics, administration and defenses along 
a specific sector of the trail. For example, BT 32 was northwest of the major transship-
ment town of Tchepone; BT 31 was in Khammouane province; BT 30 was in Savan-
nakhet province; BT 35 was near Saravane; and BT 37 was near Attapeu. The number 
of PAVN troops assigned to each BT fluctuated according to the threat to that particular 
BT. In addition, BT combat units were occasionally sent west to fill the ranks of the 
968 Division. 
Once the rains began to fall in northern Laos, the government decided that, unlike 
previous years, it would heavily defend the Plain of Jars and make PAVN pay heavi-
ly to regain territory. Several dozen 105mm and 155nnm howitzers were airlifted onto 
the plain, along with eight light infantry battalions and an equal number of irregular 
Groupement Mobiles." 
As soon as the rains ceased, PAVN began planning for its biggest Plain of Jars cam-
paign to date. Because of the increased government defenses on the plain, Hanoi ap-
pointed Major-General Le Truong Tan to head the operation. General Tan had been 
PAVN deputy chief-of-staff and was in charge of the Route 9 defenses during the South 
Vietnamese incursion into southern Laos in early 1971, giving him ample experience 
in heading multi-divisional campaigns. 
On December 20, the battle for the Plain of Jars began. Tciking advantage of the su-
perior range of its 130mm artillery pieces, PAVN shelled the Lao government positions 
on the plain with impunity. General Tan next ordered a wave of PT-76 amphibious 
tanks, T-34 medium tanks and Chinese-made armored personnel carriers, followed by 
the 174 Regiment of the 316 Division. Within three days, the elaborate government 
defenses on the plain were in ruins and the PAVN were knocking on the doors of Long 
Tieng. 
In the south, PAVN was busy with another campaign, this one designed to capture 
the entire Bolovens Plateau. In the forefront of the operation was the 9 Regiment, 
which had previously been operating in an independent role. In late December, 
Owing to the loss of 
the Cambodian conduit 
and the consequent 
need to protect the Ho 
Chi Minh Trail, 
PAVN's operations in 
southern Laos took on 
a new significance 
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however, it was joined by the new 39 Regiment to form the core of the 968 Division.^^ 
CHiring the last week of December, both regiments stormed Vientiane's forward defen-
ses at Paksong and sent the government forces reeling back to Pakse. 
1972 ... 
By January 1972, PAVN was in full control of the Bolovens Plateau, with the 
government's front lines stabilized only 21 kilometers east of Pakse. 
In the north, PAVN had succeeded in moving two regiments of the 312 Division to 
the mountain ranges immediately north of Long Tieng. Documents found on dead 
Vietnamese bodies stated that Long Tieng base was to be captured at all costs. 
Meanwhile, two more regiments of the 316 Division were holding the high terrain 
between the Plain of Jars and Long Heng, while the 766, 866 and 335 Independent 
Regiments held positions to the north and east of the plain. In addition, PAVN was 
pounding Long Tieng with its 130mm artillery, marking the first major use of 130mm 
artillery in the Second Indochina War. For the first time in the war, the PAVN also 
benefited from occasional bombing and reconnaissance support from MiG-21 jets. 
After a month of relentless attacks, the government removed all dependents and sen-
sitive equipment from Long Tieng in anticipation of its imminent collapse. However, 
while some PAVN patrols were able to infiltrate into the base at night. Long Tieng 
refused to fall. 
By March, after the 312 Division was withdrawn to participate in the Easter Offen-
sive in South Vietnam, Long Tieng was reinforced and the siege was lifted. PAVN, 
however, still had the 148 and 174 Regiments of the 316 Division located between Long 
Tieng and the Plain of Jars, plus the 866 Independent Regiment south of the plain, the 
766 Independent Regiment east of the plain, and the 335 Independent Regiment nortlv 
east of the plain. 
When the rains began at mid-year, Hanoi still had a firm grip over the battlefield. So 
high was their confidence that when Vientiane launch^ a counter-attack in late 
August, PAVN remained extended across the plain and demolished the government 
forces. This was the first time that PAVfJ had remained deployed in northeastern Laos 
and engaged a multi-regimental government force during the height of the rainy 
season. 
In southern Laos, the 968 Division showed equal determination, and was even able 
to seize the town of Khong Sedone during mid-year in the so-called "Three Nations of 
Indochina Begin Firing TTieir Weapons at the Same Time" campaign. In the second 
hcdf of the year, however, the 968 E)ivision was extremely understrength as a result of 
heavy airstrikes. The division even had to resort to using cooks, medics and Doan 559 
logistical personnel to beef up its combat regiments. 
By the year's end, the government was able to sufficiently weaken the tired 968 
Division and expel the Vietnamese from all key tov^s on the Bolovens Plateau. 
Elsewhere in Laos, the PAVN had assigned the 8 Independent Regiment to harass 
Luang Prabang, and replaced the 335 Independent Regiment which had been sent to 
operate around the Plain of Jars. In the northern paiUiandle, PAVN had created Front 
R at Tchepone, composed of the 29 Regiment. Front R was tasked with protecting ihe 
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major Ho Chi Minh Trail transshipment point at Tchepone and conducting operations 
against Laotian forces along Route 9. 
I V 
By late 1972, the 
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EHiring these years of heavy fighting, the Pathet Lao was noticeably absent from the 
battlefield. Around the Plain of Jars, Pathet Lao and Deuanist Neutralist^^ battalions 
roamed the movmtains north of the plain, the Ban Ban valley to the east and the town 
of Xieng Khouangville to the south. But apart from an occasional platoon from the 
Patchay Battzdion^^ operating in a reconnaissance and psychological warfare role 
alongside PAVN forces, no Pathet Lao formation participated in any of the Plain of 
Jars offensives, sieges or defensive actions. 
In northwestern Laos, extended lines of supply and thick jungles impaired Pathet 
Lao activity. When any noteworthy communist rrulitary activity did occur, such as the 
February 1973 capture of Nam Yu, PAVN forces were in the forefront. 
On the Bolovens Plateau, the Pathet Lao were similarly uninvolved in combat. Much 
of their inactivity resulted from a November 1970 incident involving the death of 
General Phomma, a Pathet Lao regional military leader. When it became known that 
Phomma died of a battle-related injury at PAVN 968 Division medical facilities, the 
Laotian government launched a psychological warfare operation aimed at inciting fric-
tion between PAVN and Pathet Lao forces by starting rumors that Phomma had been 
"executed" by the Vietnamese. 
So successful was the operation that the Pathet Lao 11,12 and 25 Battalions rallied to 
the government Information from the defecting Pathet Lao resulted in a massive 
airstrike being launched on a PAVN regional headquarters. Relations between the 
Pathet Lao and PAVN in southern Laos remained strained for the remainder of the 
war. 
Pathet Lao relations with the Vietnamese in the upper panhandle also were strained 
at times. So bad was one local feud that a senior Vietnamese advisor was kidnapped 
and turned in by rallying Pathet Lao guerrillas at Paksane. 
Pathet Lao performance was further constrained by chronic manpower shortages. 
So severe was this problem that by late 1972 the Pathet Lao had been increasingly 
forced to turn to women and prisoners to fill fronUine transportation units. The 5 
Transportation Company at Nong Het, for example, was sixty percent female; the 
remainder were prisoners. The 368 Transportation Company at Xieng Khouangville 
and the 769 Transportation Company at the same location were both composed of 
females. 
By January 1973, with the signing of a ceasefire imminent, both government forces 
and PAVN made last-minute efforts to grab territory. On the Plain of Jars, the 
government's Operation PHOU PHIANG III was pushed back by the 316 Division 
without making any progress. In the south, the 9 and 39 Regiments succeeded in push-
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ing back into Paksong, precipitating a withdrawal of government forces from key cities 
on the plateau. In the northern panhandle, the 29 Regiment stuck out from Muong 
Phalane and hit government targets at Thakhek and Seno. 
When the Laotian ceasefire went into effect on February 22,1973, the communists — 
in the form of the PAVN — were in full control of the Plain of Jars and the Bolovens. 
The 29 Regiment, meanwhile, held the territory up to Muong Phalane on Route 9, with 
instructions to seize everything up to Dong Hene if the Laotian government reacted 
strongly before scheduled inspections by the International Control Committee. 
For the remainder of 1973, PAVN forces, having completely broken the back of the 
government armed forces, were tmder orders to begin intensive training programs for 
Pathet Lao ui\its. By the year's end, most of the 316 Division was able to return home, 
leaving behind residual PAVN units plus the Pathet Lao to fill their vacuum. EHiring 
the fol lov^g year, the 968 Division departed the Bolovens Plateau and was similarly 



















By early 1975, the Pathet Lao was easily able to overcome its larger but demoralized 
opponents. Although Hanoi was careful not to publicize its deserved credit for the 
victory — in fact, the Pathet Lao still only admits vaguely to fraternal assistance 
provided by PAVN "volunteers" during the War of Liberation — PAVN could take 
heart in the fact that it had gained much from its Laotian experience.^^ 
First, the war in Laos provided the PAVN invaluable experience on how to conduct 
coimter-insurgency operations. Until that time, PAVN had always played the role of 
the insurgents themselves. In Laos, however, the tables were turned: PAVN operated 
as a conventional infantry force complete v^ rith artillery, armor, and even air support, 
while the government army often acted as irregular guerrilla imits. To help it better 
fight insurgent forces in the future, thePAVN Senior Military Academy focused on the 
1969-1971 campaigns on the Plain of Jars and developed the lessons from those bat-
tles into a training tool for its students. Given PAVN's mixed performance in Cam-
bodia against resistance forces, however, it is questionable as to how much attention 
Hanoi is actually paying to its own lessons learned in Laos. 
Second, because of the close distances involved (compared to the South Vietnamese 
battlefield), PAVN used Laos as a platform to fieldtest new weapons. For example, 
point-detonating merctuy-tipped ammunition, apparently used on an experimental 
basis, was discovered on PAVN bodies around the Plain of Jars in 1971. Also found 
were new chemical decontamination kits. PAVN's use of MiG-21 jets in a grotmd sup-
port role, as well as the combat use of 11-28 bombers, which apparently were deployed 
on October 9,1972, against the Boumlong garrison, were also tested in Laos. PAVN 
also used Laos for extensive first-time combat use of the 130mm gim. 
Last, and most important, PAVN's experience in Laos allowed it to develop total con-
trol over the Pathet Lao. By 1975, not only was the Pathet Lao leadership indebted to 
Hanoi for its past assistcmce, but the Pathet Lao military forces were totally depend-
ent on PAVN advisory assistance and logistical support. 










Currently, Vietnam's military and economic links with Laos remain strong. In large 
part because of the close relationship Hanoi developed with Vienticine during the war 
years, Vietnam feels confident that it can now withdraw virtually all of the 50,000 
PAVN troops that remained in Laotian garrisons for a decade after the war. Other 
reasons for the PAVN withdrawal include an attempt by Hanoi to portray itself as less 
threatening in the region, a drop in tensions with China (Vietnam had stationed troops 
in Laos in part to protect its northwest flank from Chinese attack), a decrease in Laotian 
resistance activity and an improved performance in the Laotian Liberation Army. 
While Vietnamese forces may soon be leaving Laos, the Vietnamese-Laotian relation-
ship is likely to remain close. Vietnam has been the primary political and military force 
behind the Pathet Lao since its inception, resulting in the creation of Vietnam's most 
dependable ally in the region. And although Vientiane's slow attempts to formulate 
an "open door" policy with the west and its expanding relations with ethnically-re-
lated Thailand may result in what appears to be an independent economic and foreign 
policy course, the underlying principles guiding Laotian economic and foreign policy 
will — for the foreseeable future — probably not stray far from the fraternal advice 
emanating from Hanoi. 
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Kenneth J Conboy is the deputy director of the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation, USA. 
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NOTES 
1. See Indochina Report, No. 1. Jan-Mar 1985. 
2. Vietminh advisory units were drawn from the 316 Division and the 148 Independent Regiment. 
3. Reports at the time that several PAVN regiments had participated in the Sam Neua "invasion" appear to have 
been greatly exaggerated. Captain Kong Le of the 2 Para Battalion, which was rushed to the Sam Neua front, 
reported that he found only token Pathet Lao resistance in the villages he recaptured. 
4. The 335 Independent Regiment was a hilltribe unit which had elements in northern Laos since 1966. 
5. The 305 Dac Cong Command, which drew many of its members from the disbanded PAVN 305 Airborne Brigade, 
was based at Xuan f^ai. North Vietnam. The Command had administrative control over PAVN special opera-
tions units. 
6. The biplanes were armed with machine gun pylons and had specially-aparted belly dispensers designed to 
drop mortar rounds. One of the planes was shot down. A second crashed into a mountain. 
7. A Dac Cong member who participated in the raid and was later captured claimed that the Dac Cong commander 
was later court-martialled for throwing the bodies off the cliff. 
8. The 148 Regiment, a hilKribe formation, had previously been an independent unit during the First Indochina 
War. Put un^r the control of the 316 Division, it saw more sen/ice in Laos than any otf>er PAVN regiment. 
9. Previously known as Doan 766. 
10. The 766 and 866 Independent Regiments were composed largely of hilltribe minorities. 
11. The Groupement Mobiles were light infantry regiments under the command of the famed Hmong hilKribe com-
mander, General Vang Pao. Though earlier known as "Special Guerrilla Units", by 1971 they were identical in 
training, organiratk>n and doctrine to light airmobile regiments composed of four battalions each. 
12. The 968 Division, which was augmented during the following year by the 19 Regiment, was tasked solely with 
operations against the Royal Laotian Government in the southern panhandle. 
13. The Deuanist Neutralists were a splinter group from the Kong Le Neutralists and completely controlled by the 
Pathet Lao. By 1971, they maintained three understrength infantry battalk>ns ar>d one transportation battalion. 
14. The understrength Patchay Battalion was based near Nong Met and composed of Hmong tribesmen. AKhough 
it was praised in Patfiet Lao literature as an example of minority support for the communist movement, mem-
bers of the battalion revolted against the government in 1977. The battalion was subsequently disbanded. 
15. Hanoi did sir>gle out the 316 Division, 312 Division and 174 Regiment of the 316 Division for their partidpatbn 
in the war in Laos, giving each of these formations the Victory Medal. The reasons for the awards, however, 
were not made public. 
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Owing to the closed nature of the political system operating in Vietnanv decision-nruikers, scholars and businessmen who study or deal with Vietnam and its leaders have labored under gross nnisconcep-tions, often bordering on ignorance, about the workings of the systenrv the-mindset of Hanoi's leaders, 
the state of its economy, the character of its society and the nature of its links with its Soviet patrons. Con-
ditions in Vietnam's client states, Laos and Cambodia, are even more grossly misunderstood. 
The first report on Indochina to be ever published in Asia, Indochina Report fills this gap in the outside world's 
knowledge of the arcane world of Indochinese politics. Each issue of this quarterly publication looks behind 
signal developments in one of the three countries to discern key trends, explain events and assess their im-
plications for the rest of Southeast Asia. It is hoped that the insights that Indochina Report presents will con-
tribute in a small way to the efforts at building equilibrium and peace in Southeast Asia. Contributors to 
Indochina Report are specialists on Indochina largely based in the region and who have had extensive firsthand 
experience and knowledge of the three Indochinese countries. Occasionally, respected emigres write invalu-
able "insider" accounts of the processes at work in these societies. Launched in 1984, Indochina Report is now 
read by, among others, government leaders, senior foreign policy analysts, diplomats, academics, journalists, 
students of Indochinese affairs, and even policy-makers in Hanoi. 
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